Is Market-Oriented Reform Producing a “Two-Track” Europe? Evidence from Electricity and Telecommunications by Clifton, Judith et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is Market-Oriented Reform Producing a
“Two-Track” Europe? Evidence from
Electricity and Telecommunications
Judith Clifton and Daniel Dı´az-Fuentes and Marcos
Ferna´ndez Gutie´rrez and Julio Revuelta
Universidad de Cantabria, Spain
2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33018/
MPRA Paper No. 33018, posted 27. August 2011 14:44 UTC
 1 
Is Market-Oriented Reform Producing a “Two-Track” Europe? 
Evidence from Electricity and Telecommunications 
 
Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Marcos Fernández-Gutiérrez and Julio Revuelta, 
Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Cantabria, Av. De los Castros S. N., 
Santander, Cantabria, 39005, Spain 
 
Abstract 
 
The European Commission has formally recognised that adequate provision of basic 
household services, including energy, communications, water and transport, is key to 
ensuring equity, social cohesion and solidarity. Yet little research has been done on the 
impact of the reform of these services in this regard. This article offers an innovative 
way to explore such questions by analysing and contrasting stated and revealed 
preferences on citizen satisfaction with and expenditure on two services, electricity and 
telecommunications, in two large countries, Spain and the United Kingdom. In 
telecommunications, but to a much lesser extent in electricity, we find evidence that 
reform has led to a “two-track” Europe, where citizens who are elderly, not working or 
the less-educated behave differently in the market, with the result that they are less 
satisfied with these services than their younger, working, better-educated, counterparts. 
 
 
¿Están generando las reformas orientadas hacia el mercado una 
Europa de “dos velocidades”? Evidencia para los casos de la 
electricidad y las telecomunicaciones 
 
Judith Clifton, Daniel Díaz-Fuentes, Marcos Fernández-Gutiérrez y Julio Revuelta, 
Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Cantabria, Av. De los Castros S. N., 
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Resumen 
 
La Comisión Europea ha establecido que la adecuada provisión de servicios básicos 
para los hogares, tales como la energía, las telecomunicaciones, el agua y el 
transporte, es clave para garantizar la equidad, la cohesión social y la solidaridad. Sin 
embargo, son escasas las investigaciones que han analizado el impacto de las reformas 
de estos servicios focalizando en dichos aspectos. Este artículo ofrece una 
aproximación innovadora para explorar estas cuestiones, a partir del análisis y el 
contraste de las preferencias declaradas (satisfacción de los ciudadanos) y las 
preferencias reveladas (gasto) con dos de estos servicios, como son electricidad y 
telecomunicaciones, en dos grandes países europeos: España y el Reino Unido. En 
telecomunicaciones, pero en mucha menor medida en electricidad, se obtiene evidencia 
de cómo las reformas han dado lugar a una Europa de “dos velocidades”,  con una 
situación en la cual los ciudadanos de mayor edad, los no ocupados y los de menor 
nivel educativo se comportan de manera diferente en el mercado, obteniendo como 
resultado una menor satisfacción con estos servicios que sus homólogos de menor edad, 
ocupados o con mayor nivel educativo.     
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1 Introduction 
 
Public infrastructure services - such as electricity and gas, water, 
communications and public transportation - experienced an extended period of stability 
in their modes of organization and regulation in Western European countries from 
around the end of World War II to the late 1970s (Millward 2005). During this period, 
the dominance of public ownership of these sectors was justified by arguments about 
the existence of market failures (in particular, natural monopolies), the strategic and 
economic importance of many of the services, as well as concerns about social justice 
(Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2004, Van de Walle 2009). Public ownership helped act as a 
regulatory mechanism to resolve the conflict of interest between investors and 
consumers (Newbery 2004). However, from the late 1970s onwards, these services were 
subjected to deep reform. In the context of the European Union, this reform intensified 
sharply during the 1990s, particularly due to processes of market integration and 
liberalization policies in these sectors (Bauby 2008, Bognetti and Obermann 2008). In 
parallel, Member States embarked upon the privatization of many of these services. 
Reform of public infrastructure services, particularly liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization, was founded on neoclassical economic theory which rested on two 
critical sets of assumptions. Firstly, it assumed that exposing firms to competition 
would result in lower prices and increased service choice for consumers. Both from the 
theoretical perspective (Armstrong and Sappington 2006) as well as ex-post empirical 
analysis of price and choice (Fiorio and Florio 2009), it has been shown that these 
reforms did not necessarily always deliver the promised results. Secondly - and more 
importantly for this article – it was assumed that citizens, cast as rational consumers, 
would be positioned to benefit universally from these developments (EC 2004). From 
the outset of reform, however, concern had been expressed by some agents about 
whether, under market-driven rules, traditions of public service obligations and 
universal access would be undermined, and that citizens’ would end up receiving lower 
quality services (CEEP and ETUC 2000). Pressure was placed upon the European 
Commission (EC) to guarantee certain service standards, in the form of a directive or 
citizens’ charter: after a series of consultations, communications and white papers, the 
EC officially recognized in a protocol of the Treaty of Lisbon that “Services of General 
Interest” were key to the upholding of social and territorial cohesion, strengthening 
solidarity and equity, thus preserving values such as universal access, affordability, 
quality and continuity were stated to be priorities (EC 2007a).  
Now, despite the fact that reform was implemented in the name of the consumer, 
relatively little effort went into evaluating these reforms from the citizen, or even, the 
consumer, perspective (Fiorio and Florio 2008, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2010). This 
relative neglect has started to change recently, spurred by two main developments. 
Firstly, the EC has officially recognized that problems remain in making the market 
work, particular, in these infrastructure services (Dierx et al., forthcoming). Secondly, 
policy-makers have become interested in how theoretical insights borrowed from 
behavioral economics might be applied to improving ongoing reform by better 
understanding consumer behavior. Interest in behavioral economics by policy-makers 
started among the Anglo-Saxon oriented institutions, including the Australian 
Government (2007), the Federal Trade Commission (2007), the Institute for 
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Government (2010), as well as the OECD (2008 and 2010).1 From there, ideas were 
diffused to the EC, which became interested in how these insights could be used to 
improve public infrastructure regulation, in order to make the market work more 
efficiently whilst improving citizen well-being and satisfaction (EC 2008a and 2010). 
This new approach, moreover, was mooted as being able to help to develop 
policies to address emerging concerns such as “vulnerable consumers”. Vulnerable 
consumers, as defined by Andreasen and Manning (1990), are those who “are at a 
disadvantage in exchange relationships where that disadvantage is attributable to 
characteristics that are largely not controllable by them.” Burden (1988) argued that 
vulnerability in the act of consumption can be traced to two, sometimes co-existing, 
causes: on the one hand, some consumers find it more difficult than others to obtain or 
assimilate the necessary information when taking decisions about good or service 
consumption; on the other hand, certain consumers are exposed to a higher risk of 
worsening their own welfare when taking inadequate consumption decisions. The 
interest in analyzing potential vulnerability can be justified by the need to advance our 
understanding of what precisely constitutes consumer vulnerability, which attributes 
and other factors it is associated with, and how these can place certain consumers in a 
disadvantaged position in the market place. Hogg et al. (2007) argue that globalization 
and the knowledge society have dramatically increased the complexity and information 
asymmetry surrounding consumptions decisions. Thus, the notion of consumer 
vulnerability is of great relevance for this article. However, the causes of vulnerability 
are not directly observable. Instead, vulnerability is usually analysed through the study 
of how particular characteristics of citizens or people in households may render them 
potentially vulnerable as consumers (Brennan et al. 2008). Hence, in this article, we 
follow Burden (1998) and the OECD (2008) and use these characteristics as proxies in 
order to enquire whether they do indeed cause consumer vulnerability, as explained 
further in the section on methodology. 
In this light, the objective of this article is to evaluate public infrastructure 
regulation from the perspective of citizens as consumers, focusing particularly on 
consequences for equity and social cohesion. In order to examine how socio-economic 
differences affect expenditure and satisfaction, the analysis focuses on the decisions and 
attitudes of those potentially becoming “vulnerable consumers” through their belonging 
to three dimensions: those who do not work; the elderly; and/or the less-educated. We 
focus on two major infrastructure services where reforms have been particularly intense, 
telecommunications and electricity, and consider two large European countries where 
reform is advanced, the United Kingdom (UK), reform pioneer in the European context, 
and Spain, which also implemented deep reforms, albeit later, during the 1990s. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The second sketches the extent of 
reform of telecommunications and electricity in the UK and Spain before explaining 
how behavioral economics and its insights could be applied in an effort to better 
understanding consumer behavior in these markets. The third section presents the data 
used and the methodology. Next, an empirical examination is conducted of the impact 
of socio-economic dimensions that have been associated with greater consumer 
vulnerability, through contrasting stated preferences (dissatisfaction with price) and 
revealed preferences (spending decisions), in the fourth section. Finally, in the 
conclusions, findings are presented, together with conclusions and future research 
questions.  
                                                 
1 On the argument the OECD was born and fundamentally remains an Anglo-Saxon 
institution, see Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes (2011). 
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2. Rethinking the regulation of telecoms and electricity 
2.1 Reforming telecoms and electricity in the UK and Spain 
  
 The UK and Spain represent two major European economies where reforms in 
the telecommunications and electricity sectors were intense and far-reaching. The UK 
was the reform pioneer in Europe; Margaret Thatcher set into motion an ambitious 
programme including liberalization, deregulation and privatization from the 1980s 
(Florio 2004). Intense reform of these sectors in Spain followed, during the 1990s, 
responding in particular to the requirements of the EC liberalization directives (Clifton, 
Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2006 and 2007, Dubois and Saplacan 2010). Across Europe, 
reform came earlier and deeper in telecommunications than in electricity (Bance 2007). 
In parallel, the telecommunications industry underwent profound technological change 
including convergence of sound, data and image from the 1970s (Mansell, 2009), 
setting into motion the introduction of multiple new options for consumers, such as the 
mobile phone and the internet, as well as new approaches to consumer contracts and 
billing households. In both countries, telecommunications reform resulted in total 
privatization and full legal liberalization of the sector. In practice, however, the former 
incumbents in both countries still enjoy high market concentration, particularly 
Telefónica, distorting competition (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2011). In the 
electricity sector, both countries implemented full entry liberalization and unbundling. 
In the UK, privatization was total, whereas, in Spain, though far reaching, electricity 
transmission remained in the public sector. Whilst competition has generally been 
introduced in the UK, the Spanish market has remained dominated by private regional 
monopolies2 (CEEP 2010). Rather than full withdrawal from these services, the State 
took on the role as market regulator and supervisor (Majone 1996) assuming overall 
responsibility for preserving citizens’ rights as consumers to those services considered 
in the general interest. In Spain, the functioning of these markets is subject to legally-
established public service obligations, which mainly refer to guaranteeing service 
universality and security of supply (CEEP 2010). In contrast, in the UK, citizens’ rights 
as consumers are not enshrined in a specific legal document, and there was confidence 
that these issues could be resolved by the market (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 
2005).  
 
2.2 The challenge from behavioural economics 
 
Through its competence in delivering the Single Market, the EC has substantial 
powers to implement bold reform across public infrastructure services such as 
telecommunications and electricity. These policies, based on a supply-side perspective, 
had as key objectives the promotion of market integration and the subsequent opening 
up to competition (Pelkmans 2006). Following conventional neoclassical economic 
theory, citizens, recast as consumers, were conceptualized as homo oeconomicus, 
meaning that they were conceptualized as being as rational agents who would maximize 
their individual utility. As such, EC policy-makers, just like their peers implementing 
similar reforms world-wide, assumed that benefits of introducing competition could be 
shared in similar ways by all (EC 2004). Little attention, if any, was paid to the notion 
that consumers did not necessarily respond in rational ways to the market, or that 
                                                 
2 RD 485/2009 and RD-Ley 6/2009 require, from 1 July 2009, that the Spanish 
electricity sector is open to competition. However, these changes have not yet had an 
impact on market performance. 
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consumers, being heterogeneous, may respond in diverse ways to the same reform 
package. 
Behavioral economics, a newly emerging discipline, challenged this conception 
of rational, selfish individuals. This school was, in turn, influenced by the 
institutionalist school, which had traditionally constituted the main alternative to the 
conventional neoclassical approach (Hodgson 1998). Institutionalism conceives 
individuals not as isolated elements, but as agents, whose behavior can be largely 
explained by their position in the social environment and by the socio-economic 
institutions around them, including interaction between individuals, the existence of 
common concepts, norms, values and customs (Wilbur and Harrison 1978, Hodgson 
2000).  
Whilst still maintaining many similarities with neoclassical economics, 
behavioral economics shares two core aspects with institutionalism: it incorporates 
insights from other scientific disciplines, particularly psychology; and it foregrounds the 
empirical reality of agents’ behavior, rather than resting principally on theoretical 
formalizations (Berg 2010). On these grounds, the existence of biases that may 
condition individual behavior are identified such as “bounded rationality”, because of 
overconfidence, inertia, extrapolation error or loss aversion, and “limited selfishness”, 
due to altruism, cooperation or inequality aversion (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). 
Insights from behavioral economics can be particularly interesting when analyzing 
situations in which individuals’ decisions do not lead to their optimizing their situation. 
A case in point is that the benefits of competition may not occur when consumers do not 
behave in perfectly rational and do not enjoy perfect information (Gans 2005). 
Kahneman and Thaler (2006) distinguished between a “decision utility”, on which 
agents base their choices, and “experienced utility”, referring to the results obtained 
from these decisions. Combining insights from behavioral economics on bounded 
rationality and limited selfishness with institutionalists’ analysis of how the social 
environment influences consumers’ behavior, it could be derived that consumers will 
take heterogeneous decisions, and that not all consumers have the same capabilities to 
make consumption choices that lead them to maximize their own satisfaction.  
To date, the evaluation of public infrastructure reform and regulation has 
scarcely applied these concepts. However, as Ceriani, Doronzo and Florio (2009) 
observed, analyzing consumer heterogeneity could be particularly useful in these 
sectors, due to ease of implementing price discriminations, and multiple uses of 
services, leading to very different demand elasticities. The EC (2008a and 2010) has 
already started to show an interest in the possibilities of behavioral economics for future 
improved implementation of the Single Market. At best, they envisage that a better 
understanding of citizens as consumers in the marketplace might help the formulation of 
specific, targeted consumer policies to facilitate certain categories of citizens take better 
consumption decisions (EC 2008b, OECD 2008). 
3 Data and Methodology 
 
There are two main empirical sources at hand when seeking to examine choices 
and attitudes of individuals when consuming public services: revealed preferences, 
information on observable choices made by individuals; and stated preferences, derived 
from subjective expressions of satisfaction with public services, based on opinions 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002). Both options, taken alone, have various limitations, which 
have led to a debate about which is the best suited method of analyzing individual and 
social welfare. This article uses an innovative approach of using revealed and stated 
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preferences together, as complementary sources, to evaluate reform in these sectors, as 
suggested by Fiorio and Florio (2008). This approach has already been successfully 
applied in other fields (Köszegi and Rabin 2008, Whitehead et al. 2008), but it has 
scarcely been applied to the evaluation of public infrastructure services regulation from 
the citizens’ perspective, and what has been done to date is largely confined to one 
sector and one country (Waddams Price et al. 2007). 
Revealed preferences are often understood as representing objective data, so 
most economic analysis has focused on these.3 Most of the studies that have used 
revealed preferences to evaluate public infrastructure services regulation are based on 
national Household Budget Surveys (HBSs), essentially, surveys disaggregating 
household expenditure by categories. In Spain, studies include Arocena (2003) and 
Duarte, Mainar and Sánchez-Chóliz (2010); and in the UK, Gómez-Lobo (1996), Burns, 
Crawford and Dilnot (1996), Waddams Price and Hancock (1998) and Bennett, Cooke 
and Waddams Price (2002). However, taken alone, revealed preferences do not permit 
observers to analyze behavioral aspects such as why a service is not used, or to 
understand how biases identified by behavioral economists lead to individuals not 
maximizing their utility. Moreover, public infrastructure service markets are not 
competitive, but quasi-markets, so exiting and switching supplier involve high costs for 
the citizen and, thus, consumption decisions may not always reflect their real 
preferences. In this way, Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty framework (1970) is invoked, 
since voice, which can be evaluated using stated preferences, is also an essential 
element to consider. Once public infrastructure reform was set in motion, the EC 
executed Eurobarometer surveys specifically intended to analyze and keep a check on 
citizen satisfaction with these services. Some economic analysis, such as Clifton, Comín 
and Díaz-Fuentes (2005), Bacchiocchi, Florio and Gambaro (2008), Fiorio and Florio 
(2008, 2009) and Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes (2010) have used these sources to examine 
citizen satisfaction with reform. The theoretical advantage of combining stated and 
revealed preferences is to maximize the contrasting strengths of both approaches, whilst 
minimizing their weaknesses, thus aiming to enrich the interpretation of the data 
(Whitehead et al. 2008: 876). 
The evaluation of infrastructure reform from a consumer perspective is executed 
by contrasting examinations of revealed and stated preferences: firstly, the two data 
sources are analysed separately; next, they are contrasted. The logic of the analysis 
follows Kahneman and Thaler (2006) who state that, in the decision-making process, 
individuals first make their choices, reflected in revealed spending patterns; they then 
obtain a degree of (dis)satisfaction with the price of that service, which is reflected in 
stated preferences. In order to derive hypotheses for testing, we reverse the order of 
these two steps to propose: 
 
1. Citizens who are more potentially vulnerable as consumers will be more 
dissatisfied than other citizens with service prices, as a result of the spending 
decisions they take in the markets and reflecting the particular problems they 
encounter in these markets. 
2. Citizens who are more potentially vulnerable as consumers make spending 
decisions which are distinct to those of other citizens. 
                                                 
3 For an interesting debate on the objective/subjective nature of data on public sector 
performance, see the special issue edited by Van Dooren and Van de Walle (2008). 
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3. The problems of citizens who are more potentially vulnerable as consumers 
in the market are commonly observed in both countries and sectors under 
analysis. 
 
Empirical analysis of the three hypotheses is addressed firstly by evaluating 
stated preferences. Sources used are the sub-samples of the micro-data for the year 
2006, from Eurobarometer, henceforth, referred to as EB (EC 2007b). Dissatisfaction 
with service price is selected as the dependent variable, identified when the respondent 
states that the service is not “affordable”. In the case of telecommunications, 
information is disaggregated between fixed telephony, mobile telephony and the 
internet (which is the least-used service of the three). Because of this, two variables are 
considered: “dissatisfaction with the price of telephony”, which refers to dissatisfaction 
with the price of fixed or mobile telephony, and “dissatisfaction with the price of 
telecommunications”, referring to dissatisfaction with the price of one of any of these 
three services. For revealed preferences, data is derived from the micro-data for 2006 
from the British and Spanish HBSs, namely, the Expenditure and Food Survey (ONS 
2006) and the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (INE 2006). From the information 
included in these surveys, the logarithm of household spending on electricity and 
telecommunications, expressed in euros per year, is taken as the dependent variable. 
With respect to the independent variables, of particular importance are those socio-
economic characteristics which can be used as proxies of vulnerability. Following the 
definition of consumer vulnerability included in the first section, Burden (1998) 
identified six socio-economic characteristics which could be potentially associated with 
consumer vulnerability: age (both the elderly, and younger consumers); education (lack 
of formal study); income (low income); employment status (unemployment); health 
(restrictions caused by poor health); and ethnicity (ethnic minorities). In a report on 
consumers and telecommunications, the OECD (2008) included four of these 
categories: elderly/young, low income, unemployment and health/disability, whilst it 
also used rural residence. 
In this article, we select three major independent variables which may be 
associated with creating more difficulty and potential risks for consumers in the market 
place: employment (the employed versus the unemployed, represented by 
NOTEMPLOYED in the EB and NONEMPLOYED in the HBSs); age (contrasting the 
elderly, the middle-aged and the young); and education (contrasting those with low 
educational levels as the reference category with the better educated, represented by 
independent variables HIGHSECOND (Higher Secondary Education) and 
UNIVERSITY, which, in the HBSs, are described for the reference person (RP) of the 
household.  The selection of these three variables here, apart from their previous 
selection by other researchers (Burden, 1998; OECD, 2008) is justified by the fact that 
there is adequate information on them in both sources as regards availability of 
information, quality, homogeneity among the sources and the existence of a large 
enough percentage of the sample size in each case. As regards the category of 
employment, we expand the use of Burden (1998) and OECD (2008) from 
“unemployees” to the “non-employed”, to encapsulate the situation of those who do not 
work, rather than only those unemployed who are actively looking for work. 
Unfortunately, our data sources do not provide sufficient or comparable information on 
other possible proxies for consumer vulnerability, such as belonging to an ethnic group, 
health/disability and rural residence. Though the HBS includes income, the EB does 
not, so income is used as a control variable for the RP in our analysis, rather than an 
independent variable. Thus, this paper does not attempt to analyse all socio-economic 
 8 
characteristics which could be associated with consumer vulnerability, rather, how three 
major socio-economic attributes of consumers might be associated with their potential 
vulnerability in the market place. Control variables are household size and house 
ownership status (NOHOUSEPROP means those not owning their house, versus home 
owners) and, in the case of revealed preferences, household income (from the logarithm 
of the equivalent total expenditure, InSPENDequiv). The effect of each of these 
variables on the dependent variables is derived from a probit estimation, in the case of 
stated preferences, and from a linear estimation, in the case of revealed preferences. In 
both cases, for telecommunications and electricity, separate estimations are conducted 
for both countries, using the sampling weights provided by the surveys, ensuring 
representative results in terms of the whole population. 
Finally, in order to contrast the evidence obtained, as regards stated preferences, 
it is considered that dissatisfaction with service price is a direct function of two 
elements: the unit price paid (P); and a second, subjective element (V), which reflects 
the degree of pessimism in the perception, which can be derived by the respondent’s 
level of confidence in the market. For revealed preferences, spending on each service is 
also a direct function of the unit price paid (P) and, in addition, of the amount consumed 
(X), reflecting the degree of participation in the market. From the two relationships 
described, it becomes possible to interpret the effects estimated regarding the dependent 
variables under analysis as a result of differences in P, V and/or X and, thus, reflecting 
particular problems in the market. 
4 Evaluating telecoms and electricity services from the citizens’ perspective: 
Results 
The estimated marginal effects of the independent variables analyzed on stated 
dissatisfaction with service price are shown in Table 1. In the case of electricity, the 
variables representing citizens’ potential vulnerability as consumers (employment, age 
and education) hardly show any significant effects on price dissatisfaction. In Spain, 65-
year olds and over are slightly more dissatisfied than others, but in the UK, 
dissatisfaction is independent of age. Dissatisfaction among the employed and non-
employed is similar in both countries. In the case of education, there are, again, no 
significant differences across the two countries, with the minor exception of the UK 
where there is a weakly significant effect associated with an intermediate educational 
attainment. 
In contrast, in the case of telecommunications, all the variables representative of 
citizens’ potential vulnerability as consumers are significantly related to price 
dissatisfaction, independent of the indicator selected (price of telephony or price of 
telecommunications). Furthermore, all these effects show the same direction in both 
countries. So, those not employed express greater dissatisfaction than the employed in 
the UK and Spain. As regards age, there are higher dissatisfaction rates for the 65 year 
olds and over in both countries: disaggregating the services, the elderly are particularly 
dissatisfied with both mobile telephony and internet. Those over 75 years old are even 
more dissatisfied than those between 65 and 74. Finally, educational attainment is 
inversely related to price dissatisfaction in both countries. When considering the price 
of telephony, those without university education are less satisfied than graduates. For 
the price of telecommunications, those who did not finish secondary school show 
particular dissatisfaction.  
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Table 1. Marginal effects estimated on dissatisfaction with electricity and 
telecommunications prices 
    Electricity Telephony Telecommunications 
    UK Spain UK Spain UK Spain 
  Variable 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Marg. 
Eff. 
Employment NOTEMPLOYED 0.036 -0.020 0.081** 0.107*** 0.092** 0.067* 
Age <35 0.036 -0.011 0.031 -0.046 -0.008 -0.072 
 50-64 0.007 -0.018 0.042 -0.005 0.118** -0.018 
 65-74 0.070 0.125* 0.133** 0.175*** 0.303*** 0.163*** 
  >74 -0.024 0.182** 0.295*** 0.286*** 0.445*** 0.214*** 
Education HIGHSECOND 0.049* 0.037 -0.032 -0.061 -0.067* -0.094** 
  UNIVERSITY -0.033 -0.041 -0.099** -0.129** -0.157*** -0.214*** 
Control 1PERSON 0.014 0.069 0.125*** -0.010 0.136*** 0.020 
Variables 3PERSONS 0.057 0.009 0.022 -0.105** 0.018 -0.068 
 4PERSONS 0.085* 0.093** -0.049 -0.024 -0.090 -0.063 
 >4PERSONS 0.027 0.006 0.059 -0.105* 0.026 -0.097 
  NOHOUSEPROP 0.005 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.203*** 0.166*** 0.145*** 
N  1337 1006 1337 1006 1337 1006 
Wald chi2  20.46 34.29 125.57 111.03 200.99 105.32 
Prob > chi2   0.059 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* Significance level at 10%, ** significance level at 5%, *** significance level at 1%  
Source: Own calculations based on EC (2007b). 
 
Next we turn to examining correspondence between the estimated effects of these 
variables on revealed service expenditure. Results are shown in Table 2. Starting with 
expenditure on electricity, the control variables show significant effects in both 
countries. The variables representing citizens’ potential vulnerability as consumers are 
also related, in general, to expenditure on this service. Age is directly related to 
electricity expenditure in both countries, especially in the UK, which may be explained 
by lifestyle if we assume the elderly spend more time at home and, possibly, by the 
overall generally colder climate in the UK. Regarding employment status, households 
without any employed member are associated with higher spending in Spain, although 
not in the UK. Moreover, the less-educated spend more on electricity in Spain, but less 
in the UK, especially in comparison to those with university education. Our previous 
results for stated preferences in Table 1 showed the absence of significant relationships 
between these variables and price dissatisfaction. It follows that they are also not related 
to P and V, the two elements into which price dissatisfaction can be decomposed. This, 
in this case, the estimated effects of variables representative of vulnerability on 
spending on electricity can be interpreted, as those related to the control variables, 
mainly as a result of the differences in the amount of service consumed (X). As an 
exception, the elderly in Spain were observed to be more dissatisfied with electricity 
prices, corresponding to their higher spending on the service. 
 For telecommunications, those variables associated with consumer vulnerability, 
already shown to be significantly related to price dissatisfaction, were also seen to be 
related, in general, to spending. In both countries, the elderly spend more on telephone 
services: disaggregating this, they spend much more on fixed telephony, much less on 
mobile telephony and even less on internet services. Thus, controlling for income, 
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employment status, education, household size and so forth, the elderly use fixed 
telephony services more intensively, rather than using alternative communications 
services. This behaviour would seem to be best explained by inter-generational lags and 
inertia vis-à-vis the take-up of the new technologies, reinforcing evidence of consumer 
heterogeneity. Elderly people’s dissatisfaction with these two services is linked to their 
lack of participation in these markets: many may use fixed telephony to make expensive 
connections to mobile telephones, for instance. For sure, their spending decisions do not 
lead them to optimise their savings, thus minimise their own dissatisfaction.  
 As regards employment status, those households with no employed member and, 
to a lesser extent, households with one employed member, spend less on 
telecommunications in both countries, which can be explained by their negative 
perceptions about affordability. Finally, with regard to education, lower levels of 
education are associated with lower spending on telecommunications in Spain, though 
not in the UK. Simultaneously observed higher levels of dissatisfaction and lower 
spending on telecommunications among the household with no employed members, 
and, in Spain, also among the lower-educated, are interpreted necessarily as being 
derived from a more pessimistic perception (V) and/or lower amount consumed of the 
service (X), apart from possible differences in the unit price (P). Consequently, the 
combined evidence indicates that citizens face problems in the telecommunications 
markets, reflected in lower confidence (linked to the higher V) and/or lower 
participation (related to the lower X). In the case of lower-educated in the UK, the 
problems reflected by higher dissatisfaction can be interpreted as being derived from V, 
although differences may also exist in P and X. 
 
Table 2. Effects estimated on spending on electricity and telecommunications 
  Electricity Telecommunications 
    UK Spain UK Spain 
    Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
  Constant term -0,909* -2,170*** -0,352 -3,900*** 
Employment ONEEMPLOYED -0,002 0,031 -0,158*** -0,157*** 
  NONEEMPLOYED -0,123 0,160*** -0,447*** -0,325*** 
Age RP <35 -0,016 -0,115*** -0,013 0,044 
  RP 50-64 0,435*** 0,073*** 0,030 0,220*** 
  RP 65-74 0,759*** 0,114*** 0,148* 0,227*** 
  RP >74 1,002*** 0,105** 0,270*** 0,243*** 
Education RP HIGHSECOND 0,076 -0,057** -0,010 0,132*** 
  RP UNIVERSITY 0,187*** -0,137*** 0,018 0,171*** 
Control NMEMBERS 0,221*** 0,365*** 0,353*** 0,508*** 
Variables NMEMBERS2 -0,004 -0,023*** -0,022*** -0,033*** 
  NOHOUSEPROP -0,784*** -0,281*** -0,159*** -0,156*** 
  lnSPENDequiv 0,613*** 0,757*** 0,616*** 0,932*** 
N   6645 19435 6645 19435 
F   52,97 387.65 85,09 369,80 
Prob > F   0 0 0 0 
RP = Reference Person         
* Significance level at 10%, ** significance level at 5%, *** significance level at 1% 
Source: Own calculations based on INE (2006) and ONS (2006). 
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5 Conclusions 
Results obtained are now applied to address the three hypotheses. The first 
stated that those citizens more potentially vulnerable as consumers would express 
higher levels of dissatisfaction with these services. In the case of telecommunications, 
it was shown that those not working, the elderly and the lower-educated, were indeed 
more dissatisfied with prices. These findings coincide with the study by Bacchiocchi, 
Florio and Gambaro (2008) on satisfaction with fixed telephony in the EU-15 
between 2000 and 2004, the main difference being that, in our contribution, mobile 
and internet communications were also included. Their inclusion turned out to be 
important, as some of the most potentially vulnerable of consumers, the very elderly, 
are sharply dissatisfied particularly with them. It seems that a combination of issues 
including technological change and product innovation, affordability and inter-
generational difference help explain greater reluctance to use these new 
communications services, as will be discussed below. In contrast, for electricity, no 
significant associations were found between potentially vulnerable consumers and 
price dissatisfaction in the two countries selected for 2006. Other research, such as 
Fiorio and Florio (2008), found that the unemployed and less-educated were less 
satisfied with electricity prices, whilst the very elderly were more satisfied, in the EU-
15 in an earlier period (2000 to 2004). The second hypothesis posited that those more 
potentially vulnerable as consumers would make different spending decisions than 
other citizens. On contrasting stated and revealed preferences, different 
interpretations can be derived from the evidence. For telecommunications, the most 
potentially vulnerable citizens expressed high levels of dissatisfaction which was 
associated with their different spending decisions. In the cases of those who do not 
work and lower-educated people, high dissatisfaction is related to their lower levels 
of confidence and/or lower participation in the market. As regards the elderly, this 
category reveals differences when taking decisions about spending on mobile and 
internet communications. Decisions to spend instead more on traditional, fixed 
telephony are associated with their high dissatisfaction levels with the alternative 
services. In contrast, for electricity, the differences observed are derived, in general, 
from differences in the amount consumed, as there are very few significant effects on 
price dissatisfaction. Finally, in relation to the third hypothesis, which posited that the 
problems exhibited by people in socio-economic categories associated with 
vulnerability would be similar across the two countries, this was found to be 
generally correct for telecommunications, whereas the evidence on electricity was 
more mixed. 
The differences observed between the telecommunications and electricity 
sectors merit some explanation. First, in the case of telecommunications, dramatic 
technological innovation has been accompanied by the introduction to the market 
place of new communications services, revolutionizing the ways in which people may 
communicate whilst posing increasingly complex consumption decisions. This - 
combined with privatization, liberalization and competition policies - means that 
consumers face a world of diverse, partially substitutable technical products of 
multiple potential providers. The consumption decision of whether to communicate, 
how, when, for how long and why - a relatively straightforward one in the age of the 
fixed telephony provider in the age of the national monopoly regime - has evolved 
into one where consumers face a barrage of (over) information, not just about the 
initial consumption decision but also questions about contractual and billing 
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processes. Whilst the electricity sector, in contrast, has not stood still in technological 
terms, consumers do not have comparable choices: whilst consumers are faced with 
the option of sending an email, an SMS message, or making a mobile or fixed call, 
electricity is a single product. Moreover, public policy reform has come much earlier 
on in the telecommunications sector than in the electricity sector, whilst 
telecommunications reform was quite swift whereas in electricity it has been partially 
blocked. Both in Spain and the UK, consumers could benefit from choice in 
telecommunications supplier much earlier than they could from choice in electricity 
supply. In the UK, consumers had options to switch several years before they could in 
Spain; nevertheless, a study by Waddams and Wilson (2010) showed that proxies of 
potential consumer vulnerability, particularly lower educational attainment, had 
restricted switching activity in 2005. In Spain, consumers only started to have the 
option to choose among multiple providers from 2009, three years after the year 
under study here.  Nevertheless, this result requires more analysis, which the authors 
are presently conducting for twelve EU Member States in the same year for 
telecommunications, electricity and gas. 
Moreover, the findings reinforce a basic observation: common policy reforms 
and regulation can have different effects on citizens, who are heterogeneous, and thus 
do not necessarily behave in a uniform and rational manner. On entering the market, 
individuals do not have the same capacity or social environment to enable them to 
maximize their satisfaction. Citizens, as suggested by institutionalists, have different 
social, cultural and cognitive backgrounds. They are conditioned by their different 
social and relational environments, and this influences the processes of decision-
making. This statement can be combined with the new insights from Behavioural 
Economics regarding biases in decision making that lead to behaviour which is not 
always perfectly rational and selfish. Thus, it can be derived that, on entering the 
market, individuals do not have the same capacity or social environment to enable 
them to maximize their satisfaction: certain socio-economic groups, therefore, may be 
more potentially vulnerable as consumers. In our findings here, potentially vulnerable 
groups have found the new environment in the telecommunications market of 
particular complexity, much more so than in the electricity market, which, though it 
has undergone reform, earlier in the UK than Spain, has not experienced equivalent 
technological change leading to product innovation such as mobile and internet 
communications. 
These findings are also significant from the perspective of policy-makers. 
Telecoms and electricity reform and regulation were designed from the supply-side, 
and little or no attention was paid to citizens’ heterogeneity as consumers. The central 
issue is that, in the absence of compensatory regulatory policies, these reforms can 
have a negative impact on public service obligations, including issues of service 
universality and affordability. Of more concern still, it is, in general, those individuals 
who are potentially vulnerable in the market who may find their vulnerability 
increases. Given the EC holds that these services are amongst those understood as 
key to ensuring equity, solidarity and social cohesion (EC 2007a), the task of 
enquiring how reform of these sectors affects certain socio-economic groups 
associated with consumer vulnerability is an important one for the future evolution of 
public policy in the European Union.  
Finally, the findings obtained point to the need to continue to redefine EC 
regulatory policies in these sectors, particularly by incorporating better insights on 
consumer heterogeneity in the design, implementation and evaluation of policy. 
Already, in recognition of the emergence of new issues as a consequence of the 
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reform of public infrastructure services, some new regulation and programs have been 
implemented by governments and firms targeting consumers in particular socio-
economic groups. In the UK, in the electricity sector, the electricity and gas regulator, 
OFGEM, launched a “Social Action Strategy” from 2000, in response to emerging 
evidence on problems such as unaffordable energy prices to the most potentially 
vulnerable (OFGEM 2010). The British government has offered “Cold Weather 
Payments” during periods of particularly cold weather for those on low incomes. In 
the telecommunications sector, the ex-incumbent, BT, launched a service called “BT 
basic” from 2008, offering low-cost rental lines with restricted calls to the 
unemployed and pensioners. In Spain, the National Commission of Energy (CNE) 
offered, in 2010, a “social voucher” to consumers considered potentially vulnerable, 
effectively maintaining 2009 prices, whilst they increased by 10 per cent for the rest 
of the population (CNE 2010). A “social voucher” was also established by the 
Telecommunications Market Commission (CMT 2010) for the lowest-income 
pensioners from 2007. Telefónica, Spain’s ex-incumbent, also offered discounts on 
mobile telephone bills to the unemployed during 2009 and 2010, with the aim these 
consumers would continue to use the service during the crisis (discontinued in 
October 2010). But most of these policies are ad-hoc, patchy and partial solutions.  
As reform of public infrastructure services continues to deepen in electricity 
and gas, as well as water, it could be envisaged that the problems potentially 
vulnerable consumers face in these markets may increase. Future lines of research 
should continue to evaluate the reform of public services from the citizen perspective, 
in a sense, tracking the advantages and disadvantages of reform, and signalling or 
mapping experiences of the more potentially vulnerable consumers with a view to 
evaluating the extent to which regulation and social programmes succeed or not in 
ameliorating any negative effects of reform on the potentially vulnerable amongst us. 
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